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In “A Paradox out of Context: Harris
and Holm on the Precautionary Prin-
ciple,” Sandin criticizes the earlier
paper “Extending Human Lifespan and
the Precautionary Paradox” wherein
John Harris and I argued that the pre-
cautionary principle (PP) is incoher-
ent.1 These criticisms offer me the
possibility to briefly expand and clar-
ify some of our previous arguments,
and to show that the paradox of pre-
caution is not dispelled by attention
to context as Sandin maintains. Even
when context is fully acknowledged,
application of the PP will still lead to
paradox and paralysis.
The Criticisms Summarized
Sandin raises a number of criticisms
of our position, but I take the follow-
ing three to be the main criticisms.
First, that the PP, although existing in
different and possibly ill-defined ver-
sions, actually works as a decision-
making principle when properly
interpreted. Second, that our refuta-
tion of the epistemic version of the PP
is misdirected because no one holds
the principle in this form, and further-
more it is fallacious. Third, that our
refutation of the PP as a principle of
choice, or in Sandin’s terminology a
prescriptive principle, is an example
of what Sandin calls the argument from
absolutism, and can be dispelled by
proper attention to context. I will briefly
discuss each of the three objections to
our position and show why they fail.
The Properly Defined Precautionary
Principle Works?
Is the problem with the PP only a
problem of specification or definition?
Sandin admits that we should perhaps
give up talking about the PP with the
definite article because there are many
different versions of the PP, but he
quickly reverts to the use of the defi-
nite article, as if there was only one
canonical version. Be that as it may, he
goes on to point out that policymak-
ers, legislators, and courts are slowly
developing interpretations of the PP
and cites the European Commission
for the views that “it would be wrong
to conclude that the absence of defini-
tion has lead to legal uncertainty,” and
that “[t]he Community authorities’
practical experience with the precau-
tionary principle and its judicial re-
view make it possible to get an ever-
better handle on the precautionary
principle.” 2 What Sandin forgets to
tell us is that the European Commis-
sion is not a disinterested party. The
European Union relies on the PP in a
number of trade disputes with the
United States and other parties, cur-
rently being decided in panels of the
World Trade Organization. The Com-
mission communication that is cited is
at least partly an attempt to bolster
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the credentials of the PP in those dis-
putes. The Commission itself makes
this point rather explicitly on page 9
of the Communication just before the
sections that Sandin quotes: “The Com-
mission also wishes to stress in this
Communication that, far from being a
way of evading obligations arising from
the WTO Agreements, the envisaged
use of the precautionary principle com-
plies with these obligations.” 3
We can therefore not take the word
of the Commission as the gospel truth
concerning the ease of interpreting and
specifying the PP.
We still lack any reliable evidence that
the PP is easy to apply when one keeps
context in mind, and if such evidence
is forthcoming we would need to know
whether the PP applied by the decision-
makers has any likeness to the versions
of the PP discussed now. The so-called
“PP” that is actually used may be as far
from the PP as a simple statable prin-
ciple, as current UK jurisprudence on
the killing of human beings is from
“Thou shalt not kill.”
The Criticism of the Epistemic
Version of the Principle
Is Fallacious
Sandin makes three points against our
analysis of a possible epistemic version
of the PP: (1) that no one actually holds
the PP as an epistemic principle con-
cerning belief; (2) that the epistemic
versions people do hold are concerned
with which propositions to act upon,
not which propositions to believe; and
(3) that a simple counterexample can
show our analysis to be faulty anyway.
With regard to the first and second
of Sandin’s criticisms, it is initially
important to note that even if he is
right, it will not get the PP off the
incoherence hook. If the PP is an epi-
stemic rule, our original arguments
showed that an epistemic PP con-
cerned with beliefs will lead us to
include many false beliefs in our
belief system. These arguments will
work just as well to show that Sandin’s
preferred epistemic PP concerned with
which propositions to act upon will
lead us to act wrongly/counterpro-
ductively/against the common good,
and so forth.
Sandin’s epistemic PP is just as hope-
less a principle as our epistemic PP.
With regard to his third claim, it
allows me to make an important clar-
ification. Sandin points out that it is
not only the number of correct beliefs
in a belief system that counts, and that
our elliptic statement that applying
the epistemic PP will lead us to in-
clude a large number of false beliefs
in our belief system is not enough to
disqualify the PP as an epistemic prin-
ciple. A belief system might be better
than another if it, along with some
trivial false beliefs, contains some im-
portant true beliefs. This is obviously
true, but the conclusion Sandin draws
is highly misleading. In the case of the
epistemic PP, the situation is exactly
the reverse, as in Sandin’s counterex-
ample. What the epistemic PP will do
is make us adopt false beliefs about
important issues, not about trivial is-
sues, because the proponent of the PP
would presumably not wish to invoke
it in trivial matters. The epistemic PP
will therefore produce a belief system
with trivial truths and important false-
hoods. It is thus still clear that the PP
is an incoherent epistemic principle,
as is any principle that negatively af-
fects the ratio between important truths
and important falsehoods in our belief
system.
The Absolutist Objection
Sandin identifies our argument against
the PP as a principle of choice and
merely a version of what he calls “the
argument from absolutism,” which
“says that the precautionary principle,
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at least some versions of it taken liter-
ally, will prohibit every action, and thus
offer no action guidance whatsoever.”
And he further states that any force of
the argument from absolutism can eas-
ily be dispelled because (1) it relies on
a literal (mis)reading of the PP, and (2)
the real PP involves a specification of
the precautionary action, a specifica-
tion of the threat context, and a spec-
ification of the level of prior evidence
of possible harm necessary to trigger
the application of the PP.
An initial response to this claim is
to point out that there are statements
of the PP in official binding treaties
that seem to support a literal and ab-
solutist reading. In the 1992 Conven-
tion on the Protection of the Marine
Environment of the Baltic Sea Area we
can, for instance, read the following in
Article 3, subsection 2:
The Contracting Parties shall apply
the precautionary principle, i.e., to take
preventive measures when there is rea-
son to assume that substances or en-
ergy introduced, directly or indirectly,
in the marine environment may create
hazards to human health, harm living
resources and marine ecosystems, dam-
age amenities or interfere with other
legitimate uses of the sea even when
there is no conclusive evidence of a
causal relationship between inputs and
their alleged effects.4
The “specification” of the threat con-
text here is so wide-ranging, from
human health and the environment,
to amenities or interference with other
legitimate uses, that it is difficult to
give it a nonabsolutist reading. If we
had chosen to argue against this ex-
pansive version of the PP, endorsed
by the 10 ratifying parties to the con-
vention, which happens to include the
European Union, our original paper
could have been very much shorter.
One might also wonder why a lit-
eral reading of the PP is wrong. Are
principles, at least important prescrip-
tive principles, not supposed to be
read literally? If they are not sup-
posed to be read literally should we
not instead call them rules of thumb
or guiding metaphors or something
other than principles? Even in the case
of prima facie principles, the literal read-
ing is the one we have to do for each
principle, before we can start prioritiz-
ing between them.
Sandin’s assertion that our approach
is absolutist must partly rely on a mis-
reading of our article, because the ver-
sion of the PP that we argue against
and show to be incoherent contains
exactly the specifications that Sandin
wants:
PP1: When an activity raises threats of
serious and both irreversible and ir-
remediable harm to human health or
the environment, precautionary mea-
sures which effectively prevent the pos-
sibility of harm (e.g. moratorium,
prohibition etc.) shall be taken even if
the causal link between the activity
and the possible harm has not been
proven or the causal link is weak and
the harm is unlikely to occur.5
Here we have a specification of the
precautionary action, of the threat con-
text (human health or the environ-
ment) and of the threat threshold, and
implicitly of the prior level of knowl-
edge necessary to activate the PP.
Sandin also classifies our approach
as absolutist because we point out that
there may be an infinite regress of
precaution in certain cases where sci-
entific uncertainty exists at the begin-
ning of a new development and at
every subsequent step in the devel-
opment process. He does, however,
strangely fail to realize that his favor-
ite remedies would not have broken
the regress in the concrete example we
discuss, the case of GM plants. Even if
a PP specified in the threat dimension
is applied in this case, for instance,
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restricting application to the context
of environmental degradation, the re-
gress would still run its course, and a
specification of level of prior evidence
would not help either. At all points in
the development, important risks of
the next step have been identified, risks
that could trigger the PP and stop
further development. This was also
true at the very beginning. At the point
just before the first GM plant was pro-
duced, important risks had been iden-
tified with “a reasonable scientific
foundation.” That this foundation was
extrapolation and speculation does not
necessarily show it not to be reason-
able, because we are talking about a
point in time when very little empiri-
cal knowledge existed.
The Argumentative Version
of the Principle
Sandin mentions one version of the
PP that John Harris and I did not
consider in our article, the argumen-
tative version, which is a principle for
what reasons or arguments are valid,
and he points to principle 15 of the
Rio Declaration as an example of this
version. Principle 15 states that “lack
of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-
effective measures to prevent environ-
mental degradation.” For the sake of
completeness, it is worth pointing out
that this version of the PP is also in-
coherent. How can we know that mea-
sures are cost-effective in a situation
where there is sufficient scientific un-
certainty to make the PP applicable?
Conclusion
As I have shown briefly above, all of
Sandin’s main arguments against the
analysis of the PP that John Harris
and I presented in our earlier paper
fail—either because they are them-
selves fallacious or because they fail
to take into account some of the as-
pects of our analysis. If anyone is guilty
of knocking down straw men, it is
Sandin and not Harris and Holm.
The PP is incoherent and no amount
of context can ever make the incoher-
ent coherent.
What we need to do is give up the
idea that there is a coherent and worth-
while PP to be found, defined, or spec-
ified, and instead start discussing how
we can make rational and reasonable
policy decisions in situations of great
scientific uncertainty. It is unlikely that
any single principle will give us the
answer to that question.
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